As Turkey hitches itself to Nato and the EU, it is a litmus test for a Russia on the wane
As Turkey pulls closer to the West, it is a sign President Erdogan is doubting the future of Russia’s influence, writes Daniel Sleat.
In May last year, Turkey said it would not be able to support Sweden’s application to join Nato. Just over a year later, President Erdogan changed his position and said Turkey would support Sweden’s membership, partly on the condition the Scandinavian country would, in turn, aid Ankara’s accession to the European Union.
This isn’t just about Sweden or Turkey, however. This combination of outcomes will likely put Russia on the back foot both in Ukraine and globally. Its efforts to weaken Nato and the West by invading Ukraine have backfired spectacularly.
Under Donald Trump’s presidency, the question surrounding the defence alliance was not so much what shape its future would take, but whether it had one at all. At the same time, Jeremy Corbyn, who was famously sceptical of Nato, was the opposition leader in the UK. The importance of the alliance was, many foreign policy experts predicted, on the wane.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine changed that. Putin’s assumption that Western weakness would be exposed was partly based on his assessment that Nato was fading in relevance and capability, particularly after the US withdrawal from Afghanistan. Events over the past year have undermined that thesis. Nato responded in a more unified and speedy manner than many expected, while the alliance found a new vigour and rationale, attracting new members like Finland and soon, Sweden.
On the battlefield in Ukraine, Nato allies have been critical in putting Ukraine in a stronger position. The news that Sweden is on course to join the alliance will be a further blow to Putin in his increasingly hollow effort to portray the war in a positive light at home.
One of the most significant elements of this week’s news, however, is what it says about the direction of Turkish foreign policy. After President Erdogan’s re-election in May, he signalled his willingness to moderate his policy-making and seek closer relations with the West. The deal struck with the Swedes, the commitment to the extension of the Black Sea grain deal, and the construction of a manufacturing plant in Ukraine for Turkish drones, all points to an important shift in Ankara’s stance.
In the final hours of negotiation, Erdogan unexpectedly raised renewing efforts towards Turkey’s membership of the EU as a price for support for Sweden. It’s more likely that progress toward US support for Turkey’s defence sector is what swayed Erdogan. However, the last-minute inclusion of EU accession was no accident and should be seen to signal a desire for deepening structural ties with the West.
Given that Erdogan has previously sought to balance Turkey’s position between East and West in general, and the West and Russia in particular, this pivot to the West is a sign of how badly the war is going for Russia in Ukraine, along with the discontent with Putin domestically, and the unity of much of the international community against Moscow. Turkey wants to be on the winning side, and they have decided Nato is it. Erdogan is a pragmatist and he is using his leverage with the West to shift closer to Europe and its allies in exchange for beneficial concessions to Turkey.
In a sense, its historical tip-toeing around East-West and wrangling with Sweden over Nato membership, has put Turkey in a strong position. That Erdogan has chosen this moment to call his cards will have sent off the warning bells in Moscow.
This article was written with Dr Matt Godwin and Jacob Delorme.