Let’s be honest, birthrates won’t go up without a religious revival
Pro-natalist policies are welcome – but are unlikely to impact birthrates without a concurrent social shift to more traditional values, writes Dr Rakib Ehsan
It may have gone largely under the radar, but data published by the Office for National Statistics (ONS) last week underscored the reality of declining fertility rates in modern Britain.
In 2024, the total fertility rate (TFR) – the average number of children a hypothetical woman would have in her lifetime if she lived through her entire child-bearing years and experienced the age-specific fertility rates for a given year – was 1.41 children per woman across England and Wales (compared to 1.42 in 2023). The TFR for 2024 represents the lowest value on record for the third year on the trot.
However, beneath the surface, there are trends worthy of attention. The London city-region and the West Midlands registered an increase in their TFRs for 2024 – the first regional increases recorded since 2021. The West Midlands region – which includes cities such as Birmingham, Coventry and Wolverhampton, along with towns such as Smethwick and Walsall – had a 2024 TFR of 1.59. Meanwhile, my Bedfordshire hometown of Luton had a 2024 TFR of 2.00 – the highest in England.
According to the 2021 Census, the Greater London area is home to 1.3m Muslims – with followers of Islam being the largest religious grouping in the eastern borough of Tower Hamlets (outnumbering both Christians and those of no religion). One in 10 people in the West Midlands region are now Muslim – rising to three in ten for Birmingham. Luton is now a majority-nonwhite town where one in three residents are Muslim. The reality is that a significant part of demographic change in modern Britain is the social conservatism of British Muslim communities – where marriage and parenthood are integral parts of adult life.
If the British political right wants to have a serious discussion on demographic change, focusing on immigration is not enough. A study last year by the Institute for the Impact of the Faith in Life (IIFL) found that nearly seven in ten British Muslims – 68 per cent – believed that people have a duty to get married and raise children to be citizens who make positive contributions to British society. This dropped to well under half – 43 per cent – for the wider general population.
Financial incentives won’t be enough
It is perfectly understandable for some to believe that modern Britain’s fertility crisis is driven by factors such as the high cost of living, expensive childcare and a lack of affordable housing. The introduction of more family-friendly and pro-natalist policies could be the solution. But the creation of ‘financial incentives’ to boost mainstream fertility rates ignores the fact that certain ethno-religious groups are relatively deprived and have more children in general.
The ‘Portrait of Modern Britain’ report published by Policy Exchange last year observed the “decline in Christian identification in a rapidly-secularised mainstream with an overriding emphasis on individual liberty”. Cultural and religious values cannot be ignored in the context of birthrates. The idea that the consistently downward trajectory of fertility rates can be reversed through government intervention is suspect. In an era of fast-paced secularisation and liberal individualism, it would need a cultural counter-challenge – possibly spearheaded by influential socially-conservative actors maximising the power of technology and social media – to encourage a renewed respect for the institution of marriage and instil a widespread belief that raising children in a good and proper way is a rewarding act of civic duty.
A more family-centred government policy agenda is welcome – but without a social and cultural sea-change encouraged by traditional-minded elements of civil society, its impact on birthrates would be limited at best.
Dr Rakib Ehsan is a senior fellow at Policy Exchange