The power vacuum in Afghanistan left by the US and the UK will draw Beijing’s watchful gaze
Foreign combat operations ended in Afghanistan years ago. For the past few years, barely 10,000 NATO forces have been helping enable a force of some 400,000 Afghans with the necessary equipment and capability to build the state.
Those support operations ended with the withdrawal this week. Since the abrupt departure of Western soldiers, Afghan forces have found themselves cut off, exposed and massacred. Others have fled allowing the Taliban to take territory across Afghanistan.
Many are watching the last flight of troops leave Bagram Airbase and drawing their own lessons. As NATO’s commitment falters, allies are more cautious and adversaries emboldened. Those closest are looking on with a mix of concern and satisfaction.
The fears of persistent power in the region has been a protective force for Afghanistan. With the US unwilling to maintain a force of some 2,000 and Global Britain pulling out its 750-strong training team, it is hardly the projection many had feared. A carrier fleet sailing by will do little to challenge that perception.
As has been noted, the UK has more soldiers deployed in Cyprus, we send more on exercise to Canada, and we have more on promotion courses at any point. This isn’t a significant military commitment, it’s a clear political statement, and one made fully conscious of the inevitable consequences.
Afghanistan has provided a valuable lesson for thousands of years: geopolitics abhors a vacuum. As we step back from the table, others are ready to step up. The immediate neighbours will be the first to act. The Wakhan Corridor is the passage of Afghanistan which reaches one of China’s westernmost cities, Kashgar in Xinjiang. This sliver of a border will have drawn Beijing’s gaze.
China has already been repressing the Uyghur Muslims of Xinjiang over fears of border instability. It’s ever-increasing energy needs also mean it has mounting interest in the resources of the Middle East. The deafening silence from almost every Muslim-majority country about the human rights violations in Xinjiang point to a successful policy so far.
Together with the lure of natural resources – Afghanistan has vast copper deposits – the perceived success of Beijing’s foreign policy could see a greater interest in the nation. Beijing has reportedly held talks with Taliban officials over the implementation of a strategy for engagement. Whilst details of these negotiations remain murky, China’s leaders are likely to pursue the opportunity to secure greater leverage over one of its biggest perceived domestic security threats – Xinjiang.
Financial support for Afghanistan is likely to be delivered hand-in-hand with Beijing’s allies in Islamabad, perhaps allowing the Chinese government to persuade the Taliban to sever links with groups such as the East Turkestan Islamic Movement – which Beijing has accused of committing a spate of terrorist attacks in its Xinjiang province.
China’s leaders will be keen to ensure that fault lines don’t emerge in its flagship Belt and Road Initiative, the global infrastructure plan to invest in dozens of strategic countries across the world. Foreign Minister Wang Yi has often spoken of the need to protect “large-scale activities and projects”. There is even talk of extending the $25 billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor down the road into Afghanistan now that the US has vacated.
There are signs that such bilateral partnerships are extending beyond infrastructure deals. China has pursued an increasing number of joint exercises with the Pakistan military and other strategic partnerships signed with foreign partners increasingly include an element of security cooperation.
So as well as the tragedy of undermining the Afghan government and people, the void we have left advertises to our allies, inconstancy, and to our rivals, opportunity. We are going to discover how Beijing exploits the vacuum our actions have served to create.
It is hard to see how the UK comes out of this stronger, or the British people safer. The decision we have taken will be remembered by many beyond the borders of Afghanistan and the cost could well be higher than keeping a small training team in Kabul. We must now find ways to change the strategy, not just the narrative.