Forget Russia, China and North Korea – Britain’s no 1 enemy is bureaucracy
Ukraine has proved that the side that can innovate fastest and deliver lethality at the lowest costs will win, writes Blythe Crawford
During this week of Remembrance, as we honour those who gave their lives for our security and values, Europe faces a stark awakening. Russia has escalated missile and drone assaults across Ukraine, struck a gathering of Ukrainian soldiers in Pokrovsk, and reportedly conducted new nuclear weapons tests — actions that underscore its intent to escalate, not de-escalate. At the same time, NATO allies have been forced to scramble jets after repeated airspace violations, including the recent incursion of Russian MiG-31s into Estonian airspace. Each of these incidents sends the same unmistakable message: Europe must turn bigger defence budgets into real equipment, faster.
Last week at Fort McNair, Pete Hegseth delivered a blistering critique of the Pentagon’s bureaucracy, paraphrasing Donald Rumsfeld’s warning about an adversary that “stifles free thought and crushes new ideas, placing the lives of our uniformed personnel at risk.” Having served in military headquarters on both sides of the Atlantic, I can confirm this enemy is shared.
After three years focused on the war in Ukraine and rising tensions in the Middle East and South China Sea, one truth is clear: the determinants of victory have changed. Rapid innovation cycles driven by robotics, autonomy and AI, a hyperconnected information environment and a surge of dual-use technology mean the side that can innovate, field and scale capability fastest and cheapest will prevail.
Ukraine has shown what speed looks like. Its distributed industrial base can iterate every four to six weeks. Furniture manufacturers that cut wardrobes yesterday are cutting drones today. Meanwhile, Western scaling remains choked by a risk-averse, process-centric system riddled with “valleys of death” where innovation goes to die when “computer says no”.
Western scaling remains choked by a risk-averse, process-centric system riddled with “valleys of death” where innovation goes to die when “computer says no”.
NATO’s new secretary-general, Mark Rutte, put it plainly: Russia has been producing as much ammunition in three months as the whole of NATO turns out in a year.
Economics matter too. The side that delivers lethality at lower cost wins. The UK’s Prototype Warfare team has supported Ukraine with £50 capabilities that Russia has tried to counter with £1m missiles. We see the same dynamic in the Red Sea, where cheap Houthi drones impose disproportionate costs on Western shipping. This demands a deliberate “high-low” mix that combines cheap disposable mass with exquisite systems, guided by quantifiable “lethality per pound production”.
Three things that need to change
So what needs to change? First, Europe has to buy together more often. When countries place separate orders for the same items, they get less for their money and end up fielding kit that doesn’t always work smoothly across borders. Joint purchases of essentials – like 155mm artillery shells or air-defence interceptors – save time and cash, and make sure allied forces can share stockpiles in a crisis. NATO and the EU have started to do this; now it needs to become the rule, not the exception.
Second, governments should focus on speed and scale, not perfection. Ukraine’s battlefields show the value of approving “good enough” equipment fast and upgrading iteratively, rather than waiting for bespoke systems that arrive years late.
Third, Europe must pay for industrial capacity, not just units. Short, stop-start orders deter firms from hiring workers, expanding lines or investing in new machinery. Multi-year contracts and targeted co-investment build the resilience and surge capacity modern conflict requires. The EU’s new programs to boost ammunition production are a step in that direction and should be scaled up.
Finally, procurement itself has to move at “digital speed.” Today’s system resembles a 1990s dial-up modem in a 5G world: slow supplier discovery, mountains of paperwork and months lost forming teams that could be building. Data-driven tools can help. Platforms such as Tiberius Aerospace’s Grail platform enables governments to identify suppliers, grow sovereign industrial bases and award contracts faster, with continuous vetting. Widening competition and accelerating integration can shave months off timelines and unlock capacity already latent across the West.
None of this is about turning Europe into a war economy. It’s about being realistic. Airspace violations and other pressure tactics are meant to test how quickly democracies respond. Europe has already decided to spend more on defence. Now it has to prove that those euros, pounds and kroner become real capability – delivered on time, in the quantities that matter. That is how you deter, and how you keep incidents from spiralling into something far worse.
Blythe Crawford CBE is the former Commandant of the Air and Space Warfare Centre, driving radical transformation of capability development in support of Ukraine.