Reform UK and the Conservatives: a coalition of the unwilling?
How credible are rumours of a deal between Reform UK and the Conservatives to “unite the right”? Asks Eliot Wilson
Last week, The Financial Times reported that Nigel Farage had told donors some kind of understanding between Reform UK and the Conservative Party before the next general election was “inevitable”. Whether a “merger”, a “pact” or a “co-operation agreement”, the implication was that Farage fears Reform UK might not sweep to power on its own. Instead, the right must maximise its vote to avoid being outmanoeuvred by a progressive coalition dedicated to its defeat.
Farage has largely denied any such plans. Observing that “sometimes people hear what they want to”, he said “I would never do a deal with a party that I don’t trust. No deals, just a reverse takeover. A deal with them as they are would cost us votes.”
Note two qualifications: he would not make a “deal” but did not rule out a “reverse takeover”. He also scotched the idea of working with the Conservatives “as they are”. We could be nearly four years away from the next election, and as Joseph Chamberlain said, “in politics, there is no use in looking beyond the next fortnight”.
It is worth remembering that, ubiquitous though Farage and his teal-tinted cohort seem, Reform’s dominance is still a recent phenomenon. Its showing at the general election was unexpectedly strong, though 14.3 per cent of the popular vote only translated into five MPs. But the party did not top an opinion poll until January this year, and its grip on the lead was only assured in mid-April.
The notion of some kind of alliance between the Conservatives and Reform UK appeals to some on the right because it seems a straightforward exercise in maximising the electoral arithmetic. With a recent poll showing Reform UK at 26 per cent and the Conservatives at 19 per cent, that seems to offer 45 per cent of the vote, a level no party has achieved since 1970. From this flows another attractive element, that Conservatives torn between traditional loyalty and the apparent vigour of Reform need not necessarily make the agonising choice. Voting for one would be voting for the other.
This does not quite work in practical terms. Most polls reflect one universal sample, but in reality the UK holds 650 elections simultaneously across parliamentary constituencies. It is not just a matter of raw numbers but distribution: in a seat where Reform was second to the Conservatives, or vice-versa like Farage’s own seat in Clacton, there is no reward for piling the votes higher.
This also assumes that voters of both parties will remain loyal in the event of any alliance, and that is far from guaranteed. There are people who have turned to Reform because they are disillusioned with all the mainstream parties, often bitterly so, and cannot be relied upon to deliver their vote if Reform, the great disruptors, then embrace the party which was in government for 14 of the last 20 years.
Conversely, with the Conservatives at an historically low ebb, there will be some among its remaining supporters who have not migrated to Reform because they are not attracted by Farage, the party or its policies. They cannot automatically be included in any notional tally.
Farage the Tory exile?
It is a frequent mistake to see Farage as a kind of Tory exile who longs for a homecoming, albeit on his own terms. It is nearly 34 years since he left the Conservative Party, and he has been clear over the past two years that his aim is to “destroy” it. He is not a prodigal son – he would be the author of a hostile takeover.
Farage also reveals a sense of betrayal in saying he would “never do a deal with a party I don’t trust”. As leader of the Brexit Party in 2019, he offered Boris Johnson an electoral pact to maximise the pro-Leave vote; although he was rebuffed, the party did not field candidates in the 317 seats the Conservatives had won in 2017. Farage believes this helped Johnson to a healthy majority and feels let down by subsequent government policy, especially on migration.
Trust works both ways. Before Farage’s unexpected return to the front line, Reform had agreed a pact with Jim Allister’s Traditional Unionist Voice to field mutually agreed candidates in Northern Ireland. Having resumed the party leadership, Farage gave his endorsement to his friends Ian Paisley and Sammy Wilson of the DUP, tearing up an established agreement. Trust indeed.
At this stage there is limited advantage for either party in a Reform/Conservative alliance. It would delight some and appal others, ensure the Tories’ subordinate status and go against most of Farage’s recent rhetoric.
Farage is unpredictable and delights in confounding expectations
That said, Farage is unpredictable, and delights in confounding expectations. What is certain, looking back at the Anti-Federalist League, UKIP, the Brexit Party and now Reform, is that, whatever his chosen vehicle, Farage regards any party he leads as his own fiefdom. It is hard at the moment to imagine him opening it up to senior Conservatives, or them wanting to pay homage.
But we have a long way to go. A general election could be as late as August 2029 if the Prime Minister is so minded. Given that Reform’s tenure at the top of the opinion polls has not yet lasted nine months, anything and everything could change.
Eliot Wilson is a writer and historian; senior fellow for national security at the Coalition for Global Prosperity; contributing editor, Defence on the Brink